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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ANDERSON INVESTMENT
CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS,
UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION, and the following-named individuals in their capacity as Commissioners
of the Utah State Road Commission:
CLEM H. CHURCH, R. LaVAUN
COX, FRANCIS FELTCH, ROSS
H. PLANT and WAYNE S. WINTERS and WEYHER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
12832

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF
THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by Plaitniff-Appellant from an
order of the court below dismissing plaintiff's Complaint
as amended and supplemented.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
The Lower court granted defendants' Motion To
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint as amended and supple·
mented on the grounds that the Complaint as amended
and supplemented failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted against any of the defendants,
and plaintiff-appellant appeals from the Order of Dismissal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks on this appeal a reversal
of the Order Dismissing plaintiff's Complaint as amend·
ed and supplemented; a determination by this court
that the Complaint as amended and supplemented does
state a claim upon which relief can be granted against
any or all of such defendants; and a determination
that upon the pleadings and the evidence introduced
at the hearing on the Order To Show Cause, the pleadings and facts presented a circumstance in which a preliminary injunction could have been issued.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND
EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS
Anderson Investment Corporation, plaintiff-appel·
lant, will hereinafter be ref erred to as "plaintiff". The
State of Utah, Utah State Department of Highways,
W eyher Construction Company, Utah State Road Com·
mission and the individual Commissioners of the Utah
State Road Commission, will hereinafter collectively
be referred to as "defendants", or where appropriate,
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"State of Utah". '" eyher Construction Company, where
appropriate, will hereinafter be referred to as "Weyher".
"R" refers to a page reference in a record of the case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State of Utah, by its Highway Commission,
advertised for bids for construction of a viaduct on
North Temple Street between Second and Fifth West
streets in Salt Lake City, Utah, with bid opening to
be November 16, 1971. On November 5, 1971, plaintiff filed a Complaint ( R 104-108) in the Third District Court of the State of Utah alleging a threatened
taking and material impairment of plaintiff's rights
of access, light, air and view and a change of the grade
of the road in front of its premises located on the Southeast corner of the intersection at North Temple and
Third West Streets in Salt Lake City, directly in
front of which the proposed viaduct was to be constructed. The Complaint sought an injunction
against all defendants from proceeding with the
project until eminent domain proceedings had been
instituted. On this same day, November 5, 1971,
the Third District Court issued an Order To Show
Cause to the defendants, not then including W eyher
ConstructionCompany, to appear November 15, 1971
and show cause why a temporary injunction should not
issue enjoining the defendants from proceeding with
the project until an eminent domain action was commenced to determine and compensate plaintiff for its
damages,
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Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause came on regularly
for hearing before the Honorable James E. Sawaya on
the 16th day of November (R 109-161). Following the
presentation of plaintiff's case, counsel for plaintiff and
defendants, stipulated that if the court deems this case
as one in which an injunction might issue, all parties
would then treat the proceedings as one in eminent
domain for condemnation with a proceeding and deter·
ruination after a thorough presentation of the evidence
of the amount of damages incurred by the plaintiff
(R 149-161).
Pursuant to the Stipulation, the Honorable James
S. Sawaya took the matter under advisement and al·
lowed the State to proceed with awarding the contract
and commencing construction of the viaduct (R 149·
161).

Prior to a responsive pleading being filed, plaintiff
filed an Amended Complaint on November 24, 1971,
naming W eyher Construction Company as defendant,
the State having in the meantime awarded the contract
to W eyher Construction Company (R 97 -102) .
In response to plaintiff's Amended Complaint,
defendants, including W eyher Construction Company
on December 17, 1971, filed a Motion To Dismiss on
the ground that the Amended Complaint failed to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted ( R 96) .
On January 6, 1972, plaintiff with and pursuant
to the permission of the court, filed a Supplemental
Complaint setting forth the trespass of the State of
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Utah and its agent, Weyher Construction Company, in
the construction on North Temple Street and the total
deprivation of plaintiff's access to North Temple Street
(R 26-28).

Subsequently, on January 28, 1972, the court having
taken the matter under advisement, determined that
plaintiff's Amended Complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, and reserved the allegations of plaintiff's Supplemental Complaint for
further determination (R 15-18).
In response to plaintiff's Supplemental Complaint,
on February 7, 1972 and February 11, 1972, the defendants, W eyher Construction Company and the State
of Utah et al., respectively filed motions to dismiss
plaintiff's Supplemental Complaint (R 13-14; 11-12),
which motions were submitted to the court without
argument and were granted (R 7-8).
From the orders dismissing plaintiff's Complaint
as amended and supplemented (R 15-18; 7-8), plaintiff
appeals.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CASES OF STATE V. DISTRICT COURT,
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 94 Utah 384,
78 P. 2d 502 (1938) AND DOOLY BLOCK V.
SALT LAKE RAPID TRANSIT COMP ANY, 9
Utah 31, 33 P. 229 (1893) ARE THE LAW OF
THE STATE OF UTAH.
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The lower court, in dismissing plaintiff's Com.
plaint, has overruled and declared no longer the law
of this State, the decision of this Supreme Court in

State v. District Court, Fourth Judicial, District, 94
Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502 ( 1938) , a viaduct case identical

on the facts to plaintiff's case, and in the order has also
held inapplicable and overruled the law as set forth in

Dooly Block v. Sal,t Lake Rapid Tramit Company, 9
Utah 31, 33 P. 229 (1893).

In District Court, Fourth Judicial District, supra,

an action was brought to enjoin the defendants from
constructing a viaduct along a portion of Center Street
in Provo City, until the plaintiffs as abutting owners
had been compensated through eminent domain for '
the taking of their rights of access, light, air and view
by reason of the proposed construction, even though
there had been and would be no physical intrusion upon
plaintiff's property.
This court expressly stated that an injunction
could properly issue to compel the individual members
of the State Road Commission to institute condemnation
proceedings and adequately compensate a private
property owner when his rights of access, light, air and
view would be taken or substantially impaired by the
construction of the proposed viaduct:

"We think it is clear that the framers of the Con·
stitution did not intend to give the rights granted
by Section 22, and then leave the citizen
less to enforce such rights. We hold that this

is so whether the injury complained of by the
plaintiffs in the injunction suit is considered a
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'taking' of property, or a 'damaging' of property.
The framers of the fundamental law, after much
debate and careful consideration of the hardship
of the old rule which allowed compensation only
in the case of a taking of property, wrote into
the Constitution a provision by which we think
they intended to guarantee to the landowner
whose property is damaged just compensation
with the same certainty as to the landowner
whose property is physically taken . . .
"Much argument might be devoted to the question whether there is involved in this case a 'taking' or a 'damaging' of property. Almost countless decisions of courts might be cited on either
side of the question. We believe, however, that
in incorporating in the Constitution a provision
requiring just compensation for property damaged for public use, it was intended to put an
end to such controversy and to protect the damaged property owner equally with the property
owner whose land was physically entered upon.
"We hold that the defendant contractor and the
individual members of the Road Commission
can be enjoined from doing an act forbidden by
the Constitution." Id. at 508.
The principle announced by this court in the
District Court, Fourth Judicial District, supra, case,
is entirely consistent with the case of Dooly Block v.
Salt Lake Rapid Transit Company, supra. There this
court specifically held that Salt Lake City could be
enjoined from granting a franchise to Salt Lake Rapid
Transit Company to construct railroad tracks on Second
South, substantially impamng plaintiff's rights of
access, light, air and view, until condemnation proceedings were instituted and Dooly Block adequately com-
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pensated:
"The rights of access, light, and air, constitute
the principal values of such property, and it must
be presumed that when lots are sold the grantee1
purchase them with a view to the advantages and
benefits which attach to them because of these
easements . . . "
" ... the abutters have the right to have the street
kept open and not obstructed so as to interfere
with their easements, and materially diminisn
the value of their property. When the lots ot
plaintiffs were sold under the town-site act, above
mentioned, it was, in effect, agreed with the
grantees that they were entitled to the use ot
the street as a means of ingress, egress, light,
and air. These rights were inducements to pur·
chasers, became a part of the purchase, are ap·
purtenances to the land which cannot be so embarrassed or abridged as to materially interfere
with its proper use and enjoyment, and they are,
in effect, property of which the owners cannot
be deprived without due compensation." Id. at
231, 232.
The firm principles established in the cases ol
District Court, Fourth Judicial District, supra, and
Dooly Block, supra, have been consistently recognizea
and affirmed by this court in subsequent decisions.
In State v. Rozelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 P.2d 27u
(1941), this court stated:
"We have held that an abutting property owner
may recover for losses sustained such as
from the shutting off or interfering with
access, ligbt, or air. Dooly Block v. Rapid Tran·
sit Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229, 24 L.R.A. 610;
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State v. Fourth Judicial District Court, 94 Utah
384, 78 P.2d 502. To the extent that the present
taking or construction so violates condemnee's
rights, he is entitled to recover; but be the loss
what it may it must have a causal connection with
the taking of the property or the construction
thereon." Id. at 278.
In Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P. 2d
907 ( 1952) , this court stated:
"This court has held that the individual members
of the Road Commission may be enjoined from
proceeding to take or damage private property
without first providing for just compensation to
the owners. State, by State Road Comm. v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah
384, 78 P.2d 502." Id. at 908.
In the case of Utah Road Commission v. Hansen,

14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 (1963), this court stated:

" ... in the case of Dooly Block v. Salt Lake
Transit Co. this court stated that an owner
whose property abuts an established public street
had an easement of access thereto, and we agree
that where such is taken it would constitute the
taking of property covered by our eminent domain statute." Id. at 919.

In the case of Hampton v. State Road Commission,
21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 {1968), this court again
affirmed the principle found in the Dooly Block case:
"In Doolv Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit
Co., this court determined that the rights of access, light and air are easements appurtenant to
the land of an abuting owner on a street, and
that they are property rights forming part of the
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owner's estate. These rights "cannot be so embarrassed or abridged as to materially interfere
with its proper use and enjoyment, and they
are, in effect, property of which the owners cannot be deprived without due compensation."
Id. at 710.
The lower court by its express words, directly ovu.
ruled the principle in the Fourth Judiical District Court,
supra, and Dooly Block, supra, cases; and therefore
erred in dismissing plaintiff's Complaint as amended
and supplemented.
Any refusal of this court to provide a judicial
procedure to allow a citizen access to the courts to pre·
vent a threatened unlawful invasion and deprivation
of property, or damage to property, would make im·
potent the judical system of this State. It is incon·
ceivable that in this day the court would abandon con·
stitutional rights and privileges and leave them helpless
before the onslaught of the whims of the individuals
acting in the name of the State.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AS AMENDED
AND SUPPLEMENTED, DID NOT STATE A
CLAIM UPON WHICH INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED AGAINST ANY OF
THE DEFENDANTS.

10

A. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AS AMENDED
AND SUPPLEMENTED, ALLEGES A TAKING AND SUBSTANTIAL IMPAIRMENT
OF PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS OF ACCESS,
LIGHT, AIR AND VIEW.
In substance, plaintiff's amended and supplemented
Complaint (R 97-102) alleges: On or about October
19, 1971, the Commissioners of the Utah State Road
Commission, by way of Motion, authorized the construction of a new viaduct to be erected on North
Temple Street between Second West and Fifth West,
a portion of which was to be constructed directly in
front of plaintiff's property which lies on the Southeast
corner of the intersection of Third West and North
Temple Street. This viaduct is to occupy approximately
80 feet in width of the center of North Temple Street
leaving only a narrow 15-foot one-way street in front
of plaintiff's premises. As a direct and proximate
result of this proposed construction, plaintiff will suffer
substantial and material impairment of its rights of
access, light, air and view constituting a taking and
damaging of plaintiff's property within the meaning
of Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah, for which plaintiff has received no just compensation through eminent domain proceedings and
has no adequate remedy at law or equity other than
the injunction prayed for enjoining the individual Commissioners of the State Road Commission from commencing with the construction of the proposed viaduct.
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Defendants contended before the lower court that
an injunction should not properly issue in this case
because there is a procedural distinction between ;
"taking" and "damage" under Article I, Section 22 or
the Constitution of the State of Utah.
It is plaintiff's position that defendants have "taken"
plaintiff's property rights of access, light, air and view
by the construction of the proposed viaduct.

No serious contention can be made that as a requi·
site to recovery in an eminent domain action there must
be a physical intrusion on a private property
land. This court, together with numerous other
throughout the country, have repeatedly held to the
contrary.
In the case of Hampton v. State Road Commission,
21 U. 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968), this court correctly
pointed out the unfounded position of the State that
"Since there has been no taking of any real properfy
contained within the legal description of
deed, the alleged impairment of egress and ingress con·
stitutes a mere consequential damage to which the
State's defense of sovereign immunity is applied.":
"Respondents have overlooked the fact that all
easements of a permanent character, that have
been created in favor of the land sold, and whicn
are open and plain to be seen, and are reasonably
necessary for its use and convenient enjoyment,
unless expressly reserved by the grantors,
as appurtenances to the land. Therefore, re·
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spondents can place no reliance on the fact that
an easement appurtenant is not specifically contained within the property's legal description."
Id. at 710.
Further, the court in Hampton, supra, affirmed its
position in Dooly Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit
Company, 9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229 (1893), in that rights
of access, light and air "cannot be so embarrassed or
abridged as to materially interfere with its proper use
and enjoyment, and they are, in effect, property of
which the owners cannot be deprived without due compensation." 445 P.2d at 710. See
Cheek v. Floyd
County, 308 F. Supp. 777 (Die. Ga. 1970); Hendrikson
v. State, 127 N.W. 2d 165 (Minn. 1964); Utah Road
Commission v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917
(1963); State v. Marion, Circuit Court, 153, N.E. 2d
327 (Ind. 1958).
By the sworn affidavit of Reed H. Richards (R
63-65) , an attorney who has examined the abstract of
title to the property in question, it was established at
the hearing on the Order To Show Cause that title to
the property came by way of a patent from the United
States to Mayor Heber Wells, and then passed to Fredrick Kesler. Further, that the right-of-way over the
streets in front of such property was an appurtenance
of necessity which required no special grant in the conveyance to Fredrick Kesler, bringing this case squarely
within the holding of the Hampton, supra, and Dooly
Block, supra cases.
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For this reason alone, there is no question that the
State has "taken" plaintiff's rights of access, light, air
and view within the meaning of Article I, Section 22
of the State Constitution entitling plaintiff to the issuance of an injunction as denied by the Court below.
Even under defendants' theory of the law, there
can be no question that plaintiff's property rights of
access, light, air and view have been sufficiently im·
paired to constitute a "taking" within the meaning of
Article I, Section 22 of the State Constitution.
The Court's attention is invited to Footnote 6 on
page 710 of the Hampton, supra, case, wherein this
court clarified the meaning of the procedural distinc·
tion between a "taking" and "damage" specifically
recognizing that when property rights are unreasonably
or substantially impaired, there exists a right to com·
pensation:
"There is some language in Justice Wolfe's dis·
sent in State by State Road Commission v. Dis·
trict Court, Fourth Judicial District, footnote 3,
supra, which might cast doubt on whether inter·
ference with an abutting owner's easement con·
stitutes a "taking." The Justice clarified this
matter in his concurring opinion in State by
State Road Commission v. Rozelle, 101 Utah
464, 469, 120 P.2d 276, 278 {1941), where he
stated: " * * * Any losses resulting from
sonably cutting off their own access to
property or unreasonably interfering. with
light and air given by reason of their abutting
on a public highway are compensabl e. ***"
Id. at 710.
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The holding of the Hampton, supra, case is m
accord with this view:
"In plaintiff's remaining causes of action, insofar as they allege a substantial and material
impairment of access to their property, constituting a 'taking', the trial court erred in granting
defendants' Motion To Dismiss." Id. at 712.
Further, not only has this court in the case of State
v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah
384, 78 P. 2d 502 ( 1938), recognized that the construction of a viaduct sufficiently impairs a property
owner's rights of access, light, air and view to constitute a "taking" of these rights but numerous other
jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion.
The Supreme Court of Texas in DuPuy vs. City
of Waco, 396 S.W. 2d 103 (Texas, 1965), a case substantially identical to the present case, held that the
construction of a viaduct deprived the owner of reasonable access to his property, and he was entitled to compensation where the construction of the viaduct resulted in plaintiff's property fronting on a cul-de-sac
under the viaduct with a one-way street abutting on the
side of plaintiff's property providing access to the main
stream of traffic. In holding that this constituted
sufficient impairment of the right of access to compel
compensation, the court stated the following:
"The attorney general argues that Petitioner
has no damage because he still has complete
access to the system of public roads and summarizes his position in saying that, 'The access
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is less convenient and the loss of traffic flow
by the front door is apparent, but it is settled
that both the real elements of loss to commercial
value are damnum absque injuria.' "
"It is settled that a direct physical invasion of
is no.t required .under the present prov1s1ons of Article I, Sect10n 17 of the Constitution of Texas, to entitle an owner to compensation. It was the injustice of requiring an actual
taking which explains the inclusion for the first
time of the Constitution of 1876 of the require.
ment that compensation be paid for the damaging of property for public use."
"It is the settled rule in this State that an abutting
property owner possesses an easement of access
which is a property right; that this easement
is not limited to a right of access to the system
of public roads; and that diminishment of the
value of property resulting from a loss of access
constitutes damage."
"It is not enough that DuPuy can get to the sys·
tern of public roads and the traveling public
can get to his building. We are clear in the view
that the construction of the viaduct has deprived
DuPuy of reasonable access which entitles him
to invoke the provision of the Constitution re·
quiring the payment of compensation when prop·
erty is damaged for public use." Id. at 106, 108
and 110.

The position of the Supreme Court of Texas was
followed in the 1968 decision of City of Waco v. Tex·
land Corporation, 425 S.W. 2d 374 (1968), where the
Court of Appeals held that the construction of a viaduct
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deprived abutting property owners of reasonable access
to their building and they were entitled to compensation
where the viaduct elevated the street above the building,
deprived the plaintiffs of their former uninhibited access
and resulted in plaintiffs having access to the front of
their property under the viaduct between cement supports and access on the side of their property to a side
street which was primarily a railroad street. The court
stated:
"Plaintiffs here have access to Mary A venue,
in addition to the lower level of 17th Street
(which terminates on each end in a cul-de-sac).
But Franklin is a main and unobstructed
thoroughfare; and Mary Avenue is impaired
and obstructed by the presence of three railroad
tracks. The impairment and obstruction of a
street by the presence of railroad tracks on the
same is obvious ... We think plaintiffs' access
by way of Mary Avenue unsuitable because of
the presence of the railroad tracks.
"From the record, we conclude that under the
authority cited, plaintiffs have been deprived
of reasonable access to their properties." Id. at
376.

In the similar case of Anderlik v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 38 N.W. 2d 605 (Iowa, 1949), the
Iowa Supreme Court held that the construction of a
viaduct in front of plaintiff's premises with the resulting
substantial impairment of the rights of access, light,
air and view, constituted a "taking" of private property
within the applicable Iowa State Constitution. The
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court in awarding compensation described the remain.
ing access as follows :
"The only means of access to plaintiff's properties is over that part of the old highway be·
tween the west edge of the embankment and
their east lot line. This old road comes to a dead
end at the south line of the railroad right-of.
way. To get on the present highway from
plaintiffs' properties it is necessary to travel
what is left of the old road to Prairie avenue
which intersects Highway 84 at the southeast
corner of the Harper tract. The respective dis·
tances from this point to the Harper, Anderlik
and Robinson houses are 399, 569 and 779 feet.
Thus on a round trip into Cedar Rapids the
Robinsons must travel 3116 feet further than before." Id. at 606.
The court further pointed out that the construction
of the viaduct also obstructed and impaired the ligh4
air and view -from plaintiff's properties for which the
State must also provide adequate compensation. See
also Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, 5 N.W.2d 361
(Iowa, 1942).
Numerous other decisions have outlined the degree
of impairment necessary to recover damages through
eminent domain.
In a well reasoned opinion, the Arizona Supreme
Court in State v. Thelberg, 350 P.2d 988 (Ariz.,
1960), held that either the destruction or the material
impairment of the access of an abutting property owner
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to the controlled access highway was compensable. The
material facts of the Thelberg, supra, decision are that
the defendant's property had approximately 185 feet
frontage on a highway which was to be designated
a limited access facility. Prior to the construction of
the limited access facility, the property was being used
by the defendant as a motel with ready and unlimited
access thereto. The State proposed construction of a
controlled access highway with separate through roadways for both East and Westbound traffic. No access
was to be permitted to or from these through roadways except at certain designated points. Frontage
roads were to be constructed running parallel to the
through raodways. The frontage road in front of defendant's property was to be a one-way road going
West, the grade of which was to be from 1 to approximately 21/2 feet above defendant's property. Defendant
would have ready access to this frontage road with the
nearest access to the through roadways being 170 feet
West of the property. After construction of the controlled access highway was completed, a Westbound
traveler on the Tucson-Benson Highway could reach
defendant's property by leaving the Westbound through
roadway approximately 1400 or 1500 feet East of the
take-off road and driving down the ramp to the frontage road which served the defendant's property. An
Eastbound traveler on the Eastbound through roadway
would have to drive approximately one mile easterly
from the intersection of the takeoff road to the TucsonBenson Highway, then cross over to the through road-
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way onto the frontage road serving defendant's property.
In sum, the material facts of the Thelberg, supra,
decision are almost identical to that of the present case.
The Arizona Supreme Court stated the applicable law
as follows:
"When the controlled access highway is constructed upon the right of way of the conventional highway and the owner's ingress and egress
to abutting property has been destroyed or substantially impaired, he may recover damages
therefor. The damages may be merely nominal
or they may be severe. Other means of access
such as frontage roads as in the instant case may
be taken into consideration in determining the
amount which would be just under the circum·
stances. Other means of access may mitigate
damages, but does not constitute a defense to the
action however." Id. at 992.
The 1969 decision of the Court of Appeals of Arizona in State Ex Rel. Herman v. Hague, 459 P.2d
321 (Ariz. App. 1969), pointed out the underlying
reasoning of the Thelberg supra, decision:
"Our Supreme Court, however, has decided that
for the real economic injury which results from
limiting access, the community as a whole and
not the abutting landowner can better bear the
cost." Id. at 323.
See also Mississippi State Highway Commission
v. Null, 210 So. 2d 661 (Miss. 1968); McMoran v.
State, 345 P. 2d 598 (Wash. 1959); State v. Geiger
and Peters, Inc., 196 N.E. 2d 740 (Ind. 1964); Hen-
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drikson v. State, supra; Balog v. State Department of
Roads, 131 N.W. 2d 402 (Neb. 1964); State v. Kodama, 483 P. 2d 857 (Wash. 1971); Breidert v. Southern Pacific Company, 394 P.2d 710 (Cal. 1964).
A further matter of significance in this case was

pointed out in Rogers v. State, 321 N.Y.S.2d 481
(1971) , wherein the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that claimants were entitled to compensation for consequential damages for loss of access
to a multi-lane highway resulting in reduced size and
irregular shape of property where the remaining access
was by way of a narrow road which was unsuitable
for the highest and best use of the property. See also
Slepian v. State, 312 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1970); and State
Ex Rel. Department of Highways v. Linnecker, 468
P.2d 8 (Nev. 1970).
Not only have defendants "taken" plaintiff's property rights of access, light, air and view, but by the
construction of the viaduct, they have left plaintiff's
property wholly unsuitable for its highest and best use.
Applying the facts of the present case as alleged
in the Complaint as amended and supplemented, to the
law as outlined, it is manifestly evident that plaintiff's
right of access will be sufficiently impaired to warrant
the issuance of an injunction compelling the State to
institute condemnation proceedings and adequate compensate plaintiff for the impairment of these rights.
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The limited evidence brought out at the hearing
on the Order To Show Cause demonstrates that the
viaduct will occupy approximately 80 feet in width
of the center of North Temple Street in front of
plaintiffis property leaving only a narrow 15-foot
wide one-way street in front of plaintiff's premises,
whereas at the present time, plaintiff, its guests and
business visitors have free and unobstructed access to
all traffic flow going East and 'Vest on North Temple
Street. A person desiring to leave plaintiff's premises
from the North must enter the frontage road and proceed East parallel to North Temple Street and then
must turn right at Second West; they are denied access
to North Temple at the next intersecting street. Further, a person desiring to enter plaintiff's premises
from the West coming off from the viaduct must enter
an offramp, cross Third West Street and enter the
one-way street for entrance to plaintiff's premises. A
person desiring access to plaintiff's property from the
East must enter the frontage road on the North side
of the proposed viaduct, cross under the viaduct, travel
between cement supports and through a parking lot
and then enter the one-way frontage road immediately
in front of plaintiff's premises. In addition, as was
pointed out in the City of Waco v. Texland Corpora·
tion, supra, Third 'Vest Street is obstructed by railroad
tracks.
It is therefore evident that the lower court erred
in granting defendant's Motion To Dismiss plaintiff's
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Complaint as amended and supplemented in that clearly,
plaintiff's rights of access, light, air and view have been
both taken and substantially impaired, and the remaining access is left wholly unsuitable for the highest and
best use of the property.
Of final and paramount significance in this case is
the fact that the lower court, by granting defendants'
Motion To Dismiss precluded a jury determination,
after a full presentation of the evidence of whether
plaintiff's property rights have been sufficiently impaired to constitute a "taking", as required by this court
in the Hampton, supra, decision, if such is necessary in
view of the pleadings and evidence of record.
We therefore respectfully urge this court to reverse
the lower court's order that plaintiff's Complaint as
amended and supplemented failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, and make a determination
that the pleadings and facts presented a circumstance
in which a preliminary injunction could have been
issued.

B. PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AS AMENDED
AND SUPPLEMENTED ALLEGES A MATERIAL CHANGE IN THE ELEVATION
OF THE HIGHWAY IN FRONT OF
PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES.
In substance, plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleges
that the construction of the proposed viaduct will ma-
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terially change the elevation of North Temple Street
in front of plaintiff's property, by moving the elevation
of North Temple Street to a maximum height of ap.
proximately 22 feet and an average height of approximately 15 feet in front of plaintiff's property without
the State instituting condemnation proceedings to insure
just compensation.
By State Constitution, statute and case law, a private property owner must be awarded just compensation for the material change of the grade of the road
in front of his property by the construction of a viaduct.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 10-8-89 ( 1953)
states as follows:
"10-8-89. Whenever by the grading of any street,
alley or other public ground in a city, pursuant
to the action of the city authorities in changing
the established grade of such street, alley or
public ground, after valuable improvements have
been made upon real property abutting thereon
such real property is injured or diminished in
value, the owner of such real property or im·
provements may recover from such city the
amount of such damages or diminution in value
in a civil action brought for that purpose." Id.

Although this statute is framed in the terms of
action by a city, this court in Webber v. Salt Lake City,
40 Utah 221, 120 P. 503 ( 1911) , expressly held that
the statute is a mere codification of the principle estab·
Iished by Article I, Section 22 of the State Constitution:
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"As we pointed out in Kimball v. Salt Lake City,
supra, which was an action like the one at bar,
section 282, just ref erred to, was adopted in 1896,
after the Constitution of this state had been
adopted, and said section was evidently passed
for the purpose of harmonizing the statutory law
of this state with section 22 of article I of the
Constitution, which provides that 'private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation." Appellant's
counsel concede that this constitutional provision
is self-executing, and to make it available required no legislative aid. The right to recover
consequentiai damages for injury to private
property by reason of making public improvements therefore does not rest upon section 282,
supra, but is based upon the provision quoted
from section 22 of article I of our Constitution."
Id. at 504.
It is therefore evident that this statute applies equally
to City as well as State authorities.

To construe the statute in any other manner than
as a recognition of property rights in the street grade
enjoyed by all citizens would deny plaintiff equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by
Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah.
The present case presents a clear and simple example of the disparity that would result in reading
this statute as only applicable to cities. If plaintiff be
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denied recovery and a second property owner similarly
situated on North Temple Street be allowed recovery
merely because it was the City authorities which
changed the grade of the road in front of its premises,
there would be a clear denial of equal protection of
the laws. The Constitutions of the United States and
the State of Utah will not tolerate such inequitable and
arbitrary results.
Plaintiff's rights with respect to the change of the
elevation of the street in front of its premises were
carefully outlined in the case of Dooly Block v. Salt
Lake Rapid Tramit Company, supra, wherein this court
stated:
"Plaintiffs' lots were represented on the original
plat of Salt Lake City as fronting Second South
street which was platted in said plat, and when
they were purchased under the forms prescribed
by the town-site act the grantees secured the right
and privilege to have the street forever kept
open . . . The rights of access, light, and air
constitute the principal values of such property,
and it must be presumed that when lots are sold
the grantees purchase them with a view to the
advantages and benefits which attach to them
because of these easements . . . Such privileges
are easements in fee-incorporeal hereditaments,
-and form a part of the estate in the lots. They
attach at the time the land is platted and the
lots are sold, and will remain a perpetual incum·
brance upon the land burdened with them · · ·
"In either case the abutters have the right to
have the street kept open and not obstructed
so as to inetrfere with their easements, and ma·
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terially diminish the value of their property.
When the lots of plaintiffs were sold under the
town-site act, above mentioned, it was, in effect,
agreed with the grantees that they were entitled
to the use of the street as a means of ingress,
egress, light and air. These rights were inducements to purchasers, became a part of the purchase, are appurtenances to the land which cannot be so embarrassed or abridged as to materially interfere with its proper use and enjoyment,
and they are, in effect, property of which the
owners cannot be deprived without due compensation." Id. at 231-232.
It is therefore evident that the lower court erred
in holding that plaintiff's Complaint as amended and
supplemented did not state a claim upon which injunctive relief can be granted against the individual Commissioners of the State Highway Commission in that
the Complaint as amended and supplemented alleges
a material change in the elevation of the highway in
front of plaintiff's premises.

C. THIS ACTION WAS COMMENCED AND
HEARD BEFORE THE CONTRACT WAS
AWARDED OR THE CONSTRUCTION
WAS COMMENCED.
This court has carefully drawn the distinction between ( 1) an action seeking to restrain the State Road
Commission from doing an act, which if completed, will
cause injury and ( 2) a proceeding seeking to compel
institution of condemnation proceedings, or the recovery
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of damages, after the injury has occurred, allowing an
injunction to issue in the former case as a matter o!
course, and only allowing an injunction to issue in the
latter case if the plaintiff's property rights have been
"taken" or "substantially impaired."
In Hjorth vs. Whittenburg, 121 U.324, 241 P.2u
907 ( 1952), this court in holding that the Utah State
Road Commissioners did not need to personally respona
in damages for acts done in the good faith performanci
of their ministerial duties, stated:
"The situation differs materially from one where·
in a public official is thought to be restrainea
from doing an act which will cause injury. There
the purpose is to prevent injury and call thi,
possibility of such to the attention of the appro·
priate public officials and secure a determination
as to whether the damage will be irreparable
or compensation may be had for it. In such case,
upon proper proceedings, an appropriate deter·
mination can be made, and if the injury is com·
pensable, then the public agency responsible may
respond in damages." Id. at 909.
This view is consistent with that expressed in Shaw
v. SaU Lake County, 119 Utah 50 224 P.2d 1037 (1950)
wherein this court denied the application of the doctrine
of soverign immunity in an injunction suit brought to
compel the Salt Lake County Commissioners from put·
ting into operation a hot asphalt plant. In so holding,
the court stated:
"In the present case the plaintiffs sought to re·
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strain the creation of a nuisance, which would
impair their property rights, and for which damages would provide no adequate compensation
even assuming they could be obtained. The principal of sovereign immunity is not one which
allows the sovereign to continue to inflict injury,
but rather, one which absolves the sovereign
from responding in damages for past injuries.
It does not give the sovereign the right to totally
.the effect of its actions upon the public
or adJommg property owners. The doctrine of
soverign immunity is open to criticism, and exceptions have been engrafted upon it repeatedly
in order to obviate its harsh effects . . . This
court does not desire to extend the doctrine of
soverign immunity to include immunity from
injunction to restrain the creation or operation
of a nuisance impairing property rights. Accordingly, we hold that a county may be enjoined
from creating or maintaining a nuisance which
impairs or injures private property rights." Id.
at 1040. (Emphasis added)
There can be no question that the present action was
filed and heard before the contract for the construction
of the viaduct was awarded or the construction was commenced; therefore, the lower court erred in holding that
the doctrine of soverign immunity barred the issuance
of an injunction.
The lower court based its decision on the case of
State v. Parker, 13 Utah 2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962),
which is not controlling nor relevant to the facts of the
present case.
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The Parker, supra, case, involved a condemnation
suit by the State in which a counterclaim was brought
seeking to enjoin further construction of a freeway. The
court held that inasmuch as the action was commenced
after the construction had begun, the doctrine of soverign immunity was a bar to action, making the Parker,
supra, case completely distinguishable to the facts of the
present case where the action was filed and heard prior
to the awarding of the contract or commencing construe·
tion.
In addition, the court in the Parker, supra, case, en·
tirely passed over the question of whether there had been
sufficient impairment of plaintiff's rights of access,
light, air and view, to constitute a "taking" as required
by the more recent decision of Hampton v. State Road

Commission, supra.

Further, careful note should be made of the
fact that all of the cases cited and relied on in the
Parker, supra, decision, are cases in which suit was com·
menced after the construction had begun or was com·
pleted, compelling the conclusion that the case of State
v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, supra, whicn
has never been overruled and has been repeatedly af·
firmed, represents the law in this State today, i.e., that an
injunction can properly issue to compel the State of
Utah or a subdivision thereof to institute condemnation
proceedings and adequately compensate a
owner when his rights of access, light, air and view will
be "taken" or "substantially impaired."
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Inasmuch as this action was filed and heard before
the contract for the construction of the viaduct was
awarded or the construction was commenced, the doctrine of soverign immunity does not bar the issuance of
an injunction as prayed in plaintiff's Complaint as
amended and supplemented.

D. PLAINTIFF HAS NO ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW OR EQUITY OTHER THAN
THE ISSUANCE OF AN INJUNCTION AS
PRAYED.
By stipulation of council in court (R. 148) and
further substantiated by the affidavit of appraiser, Dan
Simons (R. 61-62), it is conceded that plaintiff's property fronting on the Southeast intersection of Third
West and North Temple has been damaged. The stipulation of the attorney general did not concede such
damage to be compensable damage.
The State, through its agents, have proposed to do
an act prohibited by State Constitution by taking plaintiff's property rights without just compensation.
Unless this court holds that this case is one in which
an injunction may properly issue, thereby forcing the
State to convert this action into one for damages and
eminent domain, the plaintiff has no remedy at law or
equity by which it can recover for the admitted damages
suffered by reason of defendants' actions.
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In the case of State v. District Court, Fourth Judi
cial District, supra, this court specifically
that presentation of a claim to the State Board of Ex
aminers is not an adequate remedy at law:

"The
on the other hand, arguea
the plamtiffs have a remedy by presentini
their claim to the State Board of Examinen
and that, if dissatisfied by the action of the Boaru
of Examiners, they may appeal to the Legis
lature.
"Does such a right constituting a plain, speed1
and adequate remedy at law so as to make i1
improper for a court of equity to issue an in·
junction, the effect of which will be to force th1
road commission to abandon the projects or in·
stitute proceedings for condemnation and
ment of compensation?
"We are of the opinion that where private prop·
erty is taken or damaged for public use, a1
alleged in the complaint in the injunction suit,
without any agreement with the owner for com
pensation, and without any proceedings for
assessment in the manner provided by the statute
relating to its eminent domain, a court of equify
may properly take jurisdiction where the onlr
remedy remaining to the landowner is to pre·
sent a claim to the Board of Examiners." Id. at
507.

The Constitution of this State grants to its citizeDl
the protection of insured compensation when their prop·
erty is taken for public use. This court cannot depriw
the citizens of this State of the injunctive remedy whicl
is the only remedy available to enforce this right.
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We therefore respectfully urge that the decision of
the lower court be deversed and that the right to the injunctive remedy to compel eminent domain proceedings
be preserved.

POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AS AMENDED
AND SUPPLEMENTED STATES A CLAIM
UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
FOR TRESPASS.
Plaintiff's Complaint as supplemented (R. 26-28)
states a claim upon which relief can be granted for trespass and in substance alleges as follows: On or about
December 1, 1971 and on each day thereafter during the
construction of the viaduct, the State of Utah, through
its agent and contractor, Weyher, unlawfully and without consent or permission, trespassed on plaintiff's
premises and directed the public traffic and heavy construction machinery over plaintiff's property.
As a result of this trespass and directing the public
traffic and construction machinery over plaintiff's property, plaintiff's improvements have been knocked down,
electrical wires and wiring have been destroyed, cars
and heavy construction machinery of defendants, their
agents and employees have been parked upon said property and ruts and paths have been cut in the hard surface
of the premises thereby irreparably damaging said prop-
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erty for its previous suitable commercial purposes.
The lower court, by dismissing plaintiff's Supple
mental Complaint, has precluded plaintiff from present.
ing evidence of defendant's repeated trespass and tn
damages resulting therefrom to a jury.
It is universally recognized that the State actin1t
through its agents cannot construct a viaduct withou
exercising reasonable care to a void unecessary injury Jr,
the adjoining property. Certainly the Complaint a,
amended and supplemented states a cause of actioL
against defendant, W eyher.

The court's attention is invited to the discussiol
found in Volume 6 of Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec·
tion 28.31, pages 664-668 wherein is outlined the gen·
eral principles governing damages resulting from the
State's or its contractors' failure to exercise reasonablt
care to avoid unnecessary injury to adjoining propert)
while exercising their powers of eminent domain:
When a corporation, municipal or private, ha1
complied with all the formal requirements neces·
sary to effect a valid taking of land by eminenl
domain, but constructs or maintains its work1
without exercising reasonable care to avoid un·
necessary injury to the adjoining property, it G
no defense to an action at common law for dam·
ages for such injury that there is an adequate
remedy provided by law for the assessment of
damages resulting from the laying out and con·
struction of such works, or even that such dam·
ages have been assessed and paid. The statutory·
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authority is to construct the works with reasonable care not to inflict unnecessary injury upon
private property, and the statutory proceeding
is for the damages which will naturally and inevitably result from the construction and operation of the works in such a manner. A corporation which acts negligently and causes unnecessary and avoidable injury to private property, when sued as a wrong-doer, cannot justify
under the statute which authorized it to exercise
eminent domain, and is liable to the same extent
that it would be if the statute had never been
enacted. In other words, the delegation of the
power of eminent domain does not carry with
it absolution from liability for negligence in
the ordinary forms of civil actions. Even when
the statute provides a remedy in the broadest
language, such remedy will not be held to be
exclusive unless expressly made so. The right
of every landowner to recover by the usual processes of law for tortious damages to his land
is important, and will not be held to have been
taken away by the legislature in any instance
unless the language of the statute has no other
reasonable meaning.
When damage is inflicted upon private land by
the negligence of a public service corporation,
whether the damage is the result of the deliberate
act of the corporation itself or is due to the
momentary negligence or disregard of private
rights by one of its agents or employees, it has
never been doubted that the liability of the corporation is to be determined upon the same principles that are applied in the case of a corporation engaged in a purely private business; but
the liability of municipal
f?r
ligence is subject to such peculiar hm1tations,
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some of which are not always clearly
"
a rather extended analysis of fr ti
stoo.d,
subject 1s necessary and will be taken up in
subsequent chapter. Id. at 664-668.
n

The comt's attention is further invited to 27 A:
Jur 2d Section 480, pages 413-415; and 2 ALR 2d6o: o
"Damage To Private Property Caused By N egligenc n
Of Government Agents As 'Taking', 'Damage' O
'Use' For Public Purposes In Constitutional Sense, a
and the numerous cases cited therein which support tf1
above principle.
It is therefore abundantly clear that the lower cour
erred in dismissing plaintiff's Supplemental Complain
thereby denying plaintiff his day in court on the issueo
defendants' trespass.

CONCLUSION
To deny plaintiff the right to the issuance of aL
injunction would render meaningless the constitutiona
guarantees found in Article I, Section 22 of the Stalt
Constitution and reaffirmed by this court in the cases oi

State v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 91
Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1938) and Dooly Block v. Sall
Lake Rapid Transit Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229 (1893).
It is well established that the immunity of the Stali
does not bar this action since there has been an unlawfill
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"taking" of plaintiff's property and property rights, and
the action was commenced and heard prior to the commencement of the construction.

'iV e therefore respectfully request a reversal of the
order of lower court dismissing plaintiff's Complaint as
amended and supplemented and a determination that
the facts and pleadings present a circumstance in which
a preliminary injunction could have been issued.

Respectfully submitted,
McKAY, BURTON,
McMURRAY & THURMAN
By Wilford M. Burton and
Steven R. McMurray
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
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